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We extended the false memories paradigm to the study of impressions 
formation. traits most commonly used in describing person-targets 
were employed to identify the four clusters underlying the implicit 
theory of personality semantic structure (intellectual positive and nega-
tive; social positive and negative). Finally, we developed lists including 
semantic neighbors of the traits closest to the clusters’ centroid and a-
thematic (non-trait) words. participants were presented with these lists 
and instructed to either form an impression of a person described by 
those words or simply to memorize them. Impression formation relative 
to memory participants produced higher levels of false memories of 
lures corresponding to the same cluster of the list traits and the reverse 
pattern was found for a-thematic words. parallel results from a gist test 
suggest that forming impressions implies the activation of a specialized 
associative memory structure underlying the referred bi-dimensional 
implicit theory of personality (rosenberg, nelson, & vivekananthan, 
1968).
“Key words that is [sic] my life: Energy. Strength. Friendship. Socialising. Fam-
ily. Goals. Art. Design. Love. Mountains. Air. Intimacy. Productiveness. Smile. 
Laughter and Dancing.”  
 —Personal profile featured on a matchmaking website
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Our impressions of others serve us well in social interaction. They tip us about 
who to trust, whom to vote for, if person X is right for the job, whether that 
used cars salesman is presenting us with a lemon or a good deal. The idea that 
these impressions are grounded on general templates or semantic structures 
has a relatively long bearing in the literature (e.g., Asch, 1946). However, the 
specific characterization of the cognitive nature of these structures has been 
only partially attempted (Cantor & Mischel, 1977, 1979; Hamilton, Katz, & 
Leirer, 1980; Schneider & Blankmeyer, 1983). In this article, we advance the 
hypothesis that these structures are specialized associative memory structures 
that share main features with other such structures, endowed with the same 
flexible powers and prone to display corresponding performance costs. 
One paradigm that has recently been successfully used to explore these as-
sociative structures is the DRM (Deese-Roediger-McDermott; Deese, 1959; Ro-
ediger & McDermott, 1995). Our goals are to adapt this paradigm to study 
the Implicit Theories of Personality, to explore its associative nature and to 
suggest a new outlook to both impression formation and associative memory 
structures.
FALSe MeMorIeS In the deeSe-roedIger-MCderMott  
(dreAM) pArAdIgM
Roediger and McDermott (1995) replicated and extended a paradigm first 
introduced by Deese (1959), the so-called DRM or DREAM (an acronym for 
Deese-Roediger-McDermott). In this paradigm, the words that are most often 
free associated with a critical concept are used to form a stimulus list (e.g., the 
words, sour, candy, sugar, bitter, good, taste, tooth, nice, honey, soda, chocolate, heart, 
cake, tart and pie formed the sweet list). When participants hear lists such as this 
and later are asked to recall them, they very often falsely recollect the (non-
presented) critical word (sweet). The level of false recall of the critical word is 
equivalent to the level of veridical recall of words presented in the middle of 
the list. In recognition tests, the level of false recognition of the critical word 
is even greater and is accompanied by strong phenomenological and source 
illusions (Payne, Ellie, Blackwell, & Neuschatz, 1996). Dual-process theories 
of false memories like the Activation-Monitoring framework explain these re-
sults as the outcome of two opposing processes, a spreading-activation pro-
cess that describes how activation converges from the associates to the critical 
concept and the failure of a deliberate monitoring process that is supposed to 
discriminate between presented from non-presented information (Roediger, 
Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001).
Thus, false memories are no longer taken to be bizarre or sui generis effects 
but, instead represent the cost of flexible associative memory structures that 
possess considerable learning powers and inference skills (Roediger, 1996). 
Subsequent research using the DRM paradigm has supported this perspective. 
In fact, false memories have been obtained with not only semantic associates 
of a critical concept (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995), but also with 
phonological neighbors (Sommers & Lewis, 1999) or even with table-related 
numerical near-neighbors (Pesta, Sanders, & Murphy, 2001). 
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the IMpLICIt theorY oF perSonALItY AS  
An ASSoCIAtIve MeMorY StruCture
From the very beginning of the field, researchers concerned with the way we 
form impressions of personality have been keenly aware that laypeople and 
expert judges alike go beyond the information given (Thorndike, 1920). In fact, 
research has shown that perceivers have strong expectations about what per-
sonality traits “go together” (Bruner, Shapiro, & Tagiuri, 1958). These expec-
tations were dubbed as implicit theory of personality (Bruner & Tagiuri, 1954). 
Moreover in perceivers’ judgments, the correlations between such traits that 
“go together” tend to be overestimated (Berman & Kenny, 1976) and they are 
as pervasive when perceivers judge total strangers as when they judge familiar 
targets (Passini & Norman, 1966). Subsequent research relying on data reduc-
tion techniques such as multidimensional scaling (Rosenberg et al., 1968) and 
cluster analysis (Cantor & Mischel, 1977; Rosenberg & Sedlak, 1972) obtained 
generally convergent results in defining the semantic structure underlying im-
pressions of personality. Such structure can be conceived as a bi-dimensional 
semantic space formed by two largely independent evaluative dimensions: 
one intellectual and one social—resulting in four clearly differentiable clusters: 
a social positive, a social negative, an intellectual positive, and an intellectual 
negative cluster. 
In addition, further research has shown that the recruitment of the seman-
tic structure underlying impressions of personality is conditional to impres-
sion formation and that this process carries reliable mnemonic consequences. 
Namely, Hamilton and colleagues (1980) have shown that when forming im-
pressions about a target described in several sentences illustrating different 
traits, participants (relative to controls instructed to simply memorize the 
same information) perform better at recall and exhibit higher clustering of the 
behaviors that illustrate the same traits. 
More recent research has corroborated the critical importance of these two 
dimensions for person impressions (for a review, see Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 
2007). From this perspective, impression formation can be conceived as a pro-
cess of placing a target in this semantic space (Brown, 1986). This conception of 
the process underlying personality impressions can explain why participants 
often go beyond the information given during impression formation, actively 
inferring non-presented traits and incorporating them into their impressions 
of personality. 
FALSe MeMorIeS And IMpreSSIon ForMAtIon
As aforementioned, false memory effects have been shown in a variety of as-
sociative structures. We hypothesized that these effects could also originate 
from impression formation. As Brown (1986) suggested when people form im-
pressions of a target’s personality from a series of stimulus traits, they attempt 
to position the target in the intellectual/social semantic space described by 
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Rosenberg and colleagues (1968). We hypothesize that impression formation 
encoding processes involve the assemblage of a specific semantic trait space 
before placement of the target in that space. For instance, if a person is present-
ed with a number of positive intellectual traits, the subsequent activation of 
these traits would gradually converge on their non-presented semantic neigh-
bors that loaded more heavily in the intellectual dimension and possess posi-
tive valence. In order to test this hypothesis, we composed four study lists that 
mainly correspond to the four clusters from the bi-dimensional implicit theory 
of personality (Rosenberg et al., 1968) and presented them to our participants, 
such that each participant was only presented with one of them. At test, we as-
sessed recognition memory for critical non-presented traits that best represent 
these four clusters. We expect false alarms to be higher for traits that belong 
to the same cluster of those included in the list than for traits that belong to 
other clusters. However, because the recruitment of the semantic structure or 
space underlying impressions of personality is hypothesized to be conditional 
on impression formation, we expected this difference to be much greater for 
impression formation relatively to memory participants.
Before we describe the present experiment more fully, a caveat is in order. 
Since the study list itself was composed by highly diagnostic trait words, it 
could inadvertently induce impression formation goals (for a similar case, 
see Lichtenstein & Srull, 1987; for an example of the implicit induction of im-
pression formation goals, see Chartrand & Bargh, 1996). In fact, as indicated 
by pilot testing, participants in the memory condition would often engage in 
spontaneous impression formation. To prevent such possibility, we also in-
cluded a-thematic words (not related to personality traits) in the study lists 
and associates of these a-thematic words in the recognition test. To make these 
a-thematic words plausible descriptors of personality, impression formation 
participants were told that the study list was composed of words provided by 
people who knew the target well. 
Thus, we predicted a higher rate of false memories under impression forma-
tion relative to memory conditions because the recruitment of the semantic 
structure underlying impressions of personality is conditional on impression 
formation. However, it can be argued that fewer false memories under mem-
ory instructions are merely due to enhanced source monitoring at retrieval. 
Memory participants might simply be better at discriminating presented from 
non-presented items than impression formation participants, because they en-
coded more distinctive features of the list items at study. They then could use 
their failure to remember distinctive features at retrieval to decide that they 
had not seen the item. To disentangle these potential different explanations 
we added a “gist” recognition test in which participants are asked to mark 
all items presented in the study phase plus all items that “could have been 
presented” because they are somehow related to presented items (Brainerd, 
Wright, Reyna, & Payne, 2002). Such a test makes remembering distinctive 
item features irrelevant, and thus prevents this “distinctiveness heuristic” at 
retrieval from contributing to performance. As standard and gist recognition 
tests differ dramatically in their monitoring requirements, the comparison be-
tween the results of these two tests has been used to differentiate between 
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alternative accounts of the conditions in which false memories decrease (Hege 
& Dodson, 2004; Schacter, Cendan, Dodson, & Clifford, 2001). In our case, the 
proposal of a specialized semantic structure that is assembled under impres-
sion formation goals will be empirically supported if the results of both tests 
are identical (i.e., greater false alarms in the impression formation than in the 
memory group). Similar performance in the two conditions will suggest a spe-
cific relational deficit for memory participants because even when they are 
tested under conditions that minimize monitoring requirements, fewer false 
alarms (highly diagnostic for impression formation) would occur. On the other 
hand, if the potential difference between impression formation and memory 
found under standard recognition test conditions disappears in the gist test, 
this will suggest that the difference is merely a function of a higher efficacy of 
monitoring of memory relative to impression formation participants. That is, 
encoding the items for a subsequent memory test facilitates later monitoring 
and rejection of non-presented critical items. 
mEThOd
pArtICIpAntS And deSIgn
One hundred and forty-nine (123 female, 26) students from the University of 
Lisbon were assigned to a 2 types of encoding context (memory vs. impression 
formation) X 4 lists (social-positive vs. social-negative vs. intellectual-positive 
vs. intellectual-negative) X 2 types of items (personality traits vs. a-thematic 
words) mixed design, the last factor being within-participants. The number 
of participants assigned to each of the eight between-participants conditions 
varied between 17 and 21. Participants received course credits in exchange for 
their collaboration.
StIMuLuS MAterIAL
A first sample of 25 students was first asked to provide short trait-based de-
scriptions of liked and disliked persons (both personal acquaintances and per-
sons they did not know personally). From these descriptions we chose the 
most frequent 40 positive and 40 negative traits. Following Rosenberg et al. 
(1968), a different sample of 27 students sorted the 80 traits in 12 sets accord-
ing to their likelihood of co-occurrence in the same person. A multidimen-
sional analysis basically reproduced the bi-dimensional structure identified 
by Rosenberg et al. (1968) (stress = .21). A 4-Way Cluster Analysis identified 
the four expected clusters that result from the combination of the two evalua-
tive dimensions: social-positive (e.g., friendly, generous, kind), social-negative 
(e.g., conceited, selfish, aggressive), intellectual-positive (e.g., cultured, smart, 
determined), and intellectual-negative (e.g., incompetent, lazy, irresponsible). 
We used this 4-Way Cluster Analysis to select the 15 words of each cluster clos-
est to its centroid. The 5 words closest to each centroid were used as the critical 
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lures (never to be presented to participants) and the 10 next words formed the 
four lists (i.e., intellectual-positive, intellectual-negative, social-positive, and 
social-negative). We also selected six a-thematic words1 not related to person-
ality traits and included them in each of the four lists we used, obtaining four 
lists of 16 words each (ten personality traits and six a-thematic words). The 
a-thematic words were common to every presented list. 
The recognition test contained 43 items: the 20 critical lures (5 per cluster/
list); 5 impression-irrelevant lures; 10 non-presented a-thematic words (in-
cluding 6 semantic associates of the presented a-thematic words); 3 presented 
a-thematic words; and 5 presented traits. So, the 5 presented traits included in 
the recognition test varied according to the studied list, but the rest of the test 
remained equal to every participant. 
The gist test was identical to the standard recognition test except for sequence 
of presentation which was separately randomized for each test.
proCedure
The experiment was run in small groups of 4 to 10 participants. In the impres-
sion formation condition, participants were asked to form an impression of 
personality of a target person described by a set of words provided by people 
who were well acquainted with the target. The participants were alerted to the 
fact that those words could be adjectives or a-thematic nouns because these 
were words that “people who know the target well associate with him.” An ex-
ample of how lists were formed was provided to participants. Namely, partici-
pants read about a man “who works in an office and often forgets his pen and 
insistently borrows his colleagues’. When asked to provide words that come 
to mind when thinking about him, his close friends and colleagues provided 
associations such as office, pen, persistent, and forgetful.” 
After the participants had read these instructions, the experimenter an-
nounced the name of the target and they heard the CD-recorded list of the 
16 words. Subsequently participants were instructed to mentally revise their 
impressions and performed this task for 90 seconds. In the memory condition, 
participants were presented with a list of 16 words and they were instructed 
to memorize them. After presentation of the list, participants rehearsed the 
presented items for 90 seconds as a preparation for the upcoming memory 
test. After this learning phase, the procedure was identical in both conditions. 
Participants performed a distracter task for 10 minutes, followed by the stan-
dard recognition test and then the gist test. The instructions for the standard 
recognition test read: 
“You will be presented with a number of words. Some of these words were 
included in the audio recording you previously listened to, others are new. 
Please read each word as it appears on the screen and indicate whether 
that was included in the audio recording or not. If you recognize the word 
1. The selected a-thematic words were: clock; phone; count; blue; wardrobe; and rose. These words 
were selected to avoid previous associations to personality traits or mood (at least, in Portuguese).
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press the green key (indicating that you consider that the word was in-
cluded in the audio recording you listened to), but if you think the word 
is new, press the red key (indicating that you consider that the word was 
not included in the audio recording). Please press the green key only if are 
reasonably certain that the word was included in the audio recording.”
The instructions for the gist recognition test read:
“You will be presented with a number of words. Some of these words were 
included in the audio recording you previously listened to, others are new. 
When you recognize a word that was presented before or you think that 
the word could be considered an example of a theme or concept included 
in the audio recording you listened to previously (even if the word itself 
was not included in the audio recording) press the green key. If you con-
sider the word to be new because it was not included in the audio record-
ing and does not exemplify any theme or concept included in the record-
ing, please press the red key.”
At the end of the sessions, participants were fully debriefed and thanked. 
reSuLtS And dISCuSSIon
Participants performed very well in the recognition test as the level of hits 
always greatly exceeded the level of false memories (see Table 1). We first ana-
lyzed hits computing a mixed-model Processing Goal (Impression Formation 
vs. Memory) X 4 Lists (Social Positive vs. Social Negative vs. Intellectual Posi-
tive vs. Intellectual Negative) X 2 Type of Hits (Traits vs. A-thematic words) 
ANOVA, the last factor being within-participants and found only a main effect 
for Type of Hits, F(1, 141) = 13.93, p = .0001, MSe = .04, η2 = .09, showing that 
participants correctly identified more presented traits than a-thematic words 
(M = .86 vs. M = .76). Our critical prediction regarded an increased level of 
false memories that semantically correspond to the cluster of the presented list 
under impression formation when compared to memory settings (see Table 
1). To test this prediction we recoded the obtained false memories into list 
matching (proportions of false memories that corresponded to the same trait 
cluster of the items of the presented list), list mismatching (proportions of 
false memories that corresponded to a different trait cluster), and a-themat-
ic associates (non-presented items that were associated with the a-thematic 
presented words). We then performed a mixed-model 2 Processing Goal (Im-
pression Formation vs. Memory) X 4 Lists (Social Positive vs. Social Negative 
vs. Intellectual Positive vs. Intellectual Negative) X 3 Type of False Memories 
(List Matching vs. List Mismatching vs. A-thematic Associates) ANOVA, the 
last factor being within-participants. We obtained a significant Type of False 
Memories main effect. This Type of False Memories effect, F(2, 282) = 222.02, p 
= .0001, MSe = .02, η2 = .58, revealed that, as expected, List Matching (M = .34) 
were much more likely than List Mismatching (M = .05) or A-thematic Associ-
ates (M = .03) False Memories. More interestingly, we also obtained the critical 
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Processing Goal X Type of False Memories interaction, F(2, 282) = 10.92, p = 
.0001, MSe = .02, η2 = .03. This interaction highlighted the fact that whereas the 
level of false memories was much higher for Impression Formation relative to 
Memory participants in the case of List Matching (M = .40 vs. M = .28), t(141) 
= 2.69, p = .0160, this difference disappeared for List Mismatching (M = .04 vs. 
M = .05, p <.25) and reversed for A-thematic Associated false memories (M = 
.02 vs. M = .04, t(141) = 2.78, p = .0031). Thus, as predicted, impression forma-
tion participants were much more prone to accept false items from the Implicit 
Theory of Personality trait space that corresponded to the presented trait list. 
This result corroborates our argument that impression formation involves the 
activation of a specific semantic structure hypothesized in the implicit theory 
of personality followed by the placement of a target on this trait space. More-
over, the fact that this difference reversed for non-presented associates of the 
presented a-thematic words speaks to the specificity of the process underlying 
impression formation. We will return to this reversal later. 
As aforementioned, participants also completed a gist recognition test af-
ter the standard recognition test. The resulting data are presented in Table 2. 
We computed a mixed-model 2 Processing Goal (Impression Formation vs. 
Memory) X 4 Lists (Social Positive vs. Social Negative vs. Intellectual Posi-
tive vs. Intellectual Negative) X 2 Type of Hits (Traits vs. A-thematic words) 
ANOVA, the last factor being within-participants. We again found only a main 
TaBlE 1. proportions of different Types of false memories by list
lists
list items (hits) Social positive Social Negative
intellectual 
positive
intellectual 
Negative
impression formation
trait Items .95 .83 .82 .84
A-thematic Items .75 .74 .82 .81
False Memories
Social positive .40 .00 .07 .04
Social negative .00 .34 .00 .04
Intellectual positive .22 .04 .46 .01
Intellectual negative .00 .05 .00 .40
A-thematic Associates .00 .04 .00 .02
memory
trait Items .90 .84 .80 .81
A-thematic Items .75 .77 .77 .71
False Memories
Social positive .21 .02 .05 .01
Social negative .00 .30 .01 .06
Intellectual positive .23 .03 .31 .06
Intellectual negative .00 .17 .01 .32
A-thematic Associates .06 .06 .01 .04
Note. proportions of false memories that corresponded to the same cluster of the Implicit theory of personality of the 
items of the presented list are in bold. N = 149
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effect for Type of Hits, F(1, 141) = 18.51, p = .0001, MSe = .03, η2 = .11, showing 
that participants accepted more presented traits than a-thematic words (M = 
.93 vs. M = .85). Again, our critical data regard the proportion of “gist memo-
ries,”2 that is, accepted non-presented items that semantically correspond to 
the cluster of the presented list (see Table 2). We predicted that the difference 
in false memories between impression formation and memory found under 
standard recognition test would persist in the gist test. To test this prediction 
we recoded our gist memories as we did for the standard recognition data 
into list-matching (proportions of gist memories that correspond to the same 
trait cluster of the items of the presented list), list mismatching (proportions 
of gist memories that correspond to a different trait cluster) and A-thematic 
Associates (non-presented items that are associated with the a-thematic pre-
sented words). We performed a 2 Processing Goal (Impression Formation vs. 
Memory) X 4 Lists (Social Positive vs. Social Negative vs. Intellectual Positive 
vs. Intellectual Negative) X 3 Type of Gist Memories (List Matching vs. List 
TaBlE 2. proportions of different Types of Gist memories by list
lists
list items Social positive Social Negative
intellectual 
positive
intellectual 
Negative
impression formation
trait Items .97 .93 .86 .89
A-thematic Items .78 .82 .84 .80
gist Memories
Social positive .81 .13 .21 .18
Social negative .12 .73 .11 .20
Intellectual positive .65 .27 .68 .17
Intellectual negative .12 .44 .12 .61
A-thematic Associates .20 .21 .14 .20
memory
trait Items .93 .93 .88 .82
A-thematic Items .81 .75 .83 .82
gist Memories
Social positive .59 .12 .21 .09
Social negative .15 .73 .16 .18
Intellectual positive .48 .14 .53 .11
Intellectual negative .14 .42 .23 .54
A-thematic Associates .47 .43 .54 .36
Note. proportions of gist memories that corresponded to the same cluster of the Implicit theory of personality of the 
items of the presented list are in bold. N = 149
2. Technically, in the case of a gist recognition test, the acceptance of a related but non-presented 
item cannot be considered a false memory because test instruction requested participants to accept 
precisely this type of item. Thus we will call gist memories to accepted non-presented items 
that relate to presented stimuli (these items correspond, of course, to false memories in standard 
recognition tests).
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Mismatching vs. A-thematic Associates) mixed-model ANOVA, the last fac-
tor being within-participants. The pattern of results paralleled what we found 
with the standard test. We obtained a significant Type of Gist Memories main 
effect. This Type of Gist Memories effect, F(2, 282) = 167.95, p = .0001, MSe = 
.05, η2 = .50, revealed that for gist memories, List Matching (M = .65) were 
much more likely than List Mismatching (M = .22) or A-thematic Associates 
(M = .27). In addition, we also obtained the critical Processing Goal X Type 
of Gist Memories interaction, F(2, 282) = 15.77, p = .0001, MSe = .05, η2 = .05. 
This interaction shows that whereas the level of false memories was much 
higher for Impression Formation relative to Memory participants in the case 
of List Matching (M = .71 vs. M = .60), t(141) = 1.99, p = .0484), this difference 
disappeared for List Mismatching (M = .22 vs. M = .20, t<1) and reversed for 
A-thematic Associated gist memories (M = .18 vs. M = .35, t(141) = 3.56), p = 
.0001.3 Recall that we include a gist recognition test because the comparison 
between the data patterns for both types of tests has been used to differentiate 
between monitoring-based and relational-deficit-based accounts of decreased 
false memories. The parallel data patterns obtained suggest that the differenc-
es between impression formation and memory participants were not due to 
differences in monitoring efficacy but instead stem from divergent relational 
deficits. Memory participants (relatively to their Impression Formation coun-
terparts) seem to exhibit an implicit theory of personality relational deficit, in 
the sense that they committed fewer false memories in standard recognition 
tests and accepted fewer gist items in the gist test for items that corresponded 
to the same cluster of the items of the presented list items. Conversely, Impres-
sion Formation relative to Memory participants display a semantic relational 
deficit, in the sense that they committed fewer false memories in standard rec-
ognition tests and accepted fewer gist items in the gist test for non-presented 
associates of presented a-thematic items. We will explore the consequences of 
these results in the final section.
GENEral diSCuSSiON
The reported results support our claim that false memories can stem from the 
implicit theory of personality semantic structure as participants form impres-
sions of personality. More specifically, the level of false memories obtained 
under impression formation instructions was higher than the level obtained 
under memory instructions. 
Moreover, the inclusion of a-thematic words among personality traits in the 
study lists led to more false alarms under memory instructions than under 
impression formation both in the standard and the gist recognition test. Thus, 
our results point to the critical importance of impression formation goals in the 
activation of a specialized semantic structure. From these results, we suggest 
that different encoding goals can lead to the activation of somewhat different 
3. A complex Processing Goal X List Valence X Type of Gist Memory was also significant 
suggesting that the above reported two-way interaction was stronger for positive than for negative 
lists.
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semantic structures. Once these specialized associative structures are active 
they seem even to interfere with the activation of the default association of the 
available stimuli, as it was the case with our a-thematic words. Under impres-
sion formation goals, the default semantic associates of the a-thematic words 
were much less often accepted in the gist recognition test than under a mem-
ory goal. Although we believe that the comparison between results from the 
standard and the gist recognition tests is suggestive, we must acknowledge 
that because the standard recognition test always preceded the gist recogni-
tion test, performance in the former may have influenced performance in the 
latter. Thus future research should examine this possibility by manipulating 
the nature of test factor in a between-participants design. 
Taken together, these results suggest that the Implicit Theory of Personality 
may function as a specialized semantic structure that is activated when the 
goal of impression formation is operative. This suggestion converges with re-
cent work that advocates that social cognition may involve more than the mere 
recruitment of basic generic cognitive processes—it may involve the participa-
tion of specialized brain structures and dedicated cognitive processes that are 
activated whenever a social cognitive goal (e.g., impression formation) is pur-
sued (Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2004). Moreover, although there have been 
previous attempts to characterize the cognitive nature of the Implicit Theory 
of Personality (Cantor & Mischel, 1977, 1979; Schneider & Blankemeyer, 1983), 
we believe that both the present characterization of the Implicit Theory of Per-
sonality as a conditional associative structure and its exploration in an experi-
mental paradigm that allows for systematic comparison with other associative 
structures (the DRM) represent a step forward to our understanding of the 
processes underlying impression formation. 
In addition, the conditional nature of the Implicit Theory of Personality as-
sociative structure may contribute to better understand false memories and as-
sociative memory in general. For instance, it seems that whereas the standard 
DRM paradigm makes use of unconditional or, at least, default associative 
structures, equivalent effects have been shown to occur only when the stimuli 
are studied under appropriate instructions (for instance, the false memories 
of numeric associates only occur if participants are carrying the appropriate 
arithmetic operations at encoding, see Pesta et al., 2001). In sum, the system-
atic comparison of the characteristics of what we here labeled conditional and 
unconditional associative structures is an important endeavor that has been 
largely ignored. We hope to have contributed with a first step to change this 
state of affairs.
Finally, we deem our success in adapting the DRM paradigm to impression 
formation as particularly noteworthy because we selected trait-words not from 
a list of associates but from casual descriptions of real people. Although theo-
retically relevant false memories obtained using the DRM paradigm could be a 
result of using particular lists of stimuli that participants would not previously 
have learned to monitor adequately; in our case, we started with trait lists 
based on dimensions that underlie common descriptions of people, asked par-
falSE mEmOriES aNd imprESSiON Of pErSONaliTy 567
ticipants to form impressions of hypothetical targets described by such traits, 
and obtained levels of false memories of considerable magnitude. Hence, our 
successful adaptation of the DRM paradigm to impression formation supports 
the notion that false memories are not the outcome of a clever but unusual 
study list but instead the cost of a flexible associative structure.
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